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Non-technical Summary 
 
R&D expenditures are a classical example for spillover effects. Information on innovation 
activities leaks out to competitors and affects their productivity and profitability. Accordingly 
spillovers have two sides: On the one hand spillovers act like a positive externality increasing 
the efficiency of the innovation process. On the other hand the own innovation output of a 
firm in question is also partly transmitted to competitors.  
The literature does not discuss, whether all kinds of innovations are affected by spillovers. In 
particular there exists no study that disentangles innovations into incremental and drastic 
innovations. In our paper we analyse the impact of spillovers from rivals on innovations with 
differing degrees of newness. The main research hypothesis is that firms have better access to 
information that is related to their current research but have difficulties with applying 
knowledge that comes form areas they are not familiar with.  
We use a sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany with detailed information on 
the type of innovation. Incremental product innovations are captured by follow-up products, 
qualitatively improved products and products with additional functions. Drastic innovations 
are covered by patent applications and the introduction of completely new products. 
Controlling for various other possible influences, we find that spillovers stimulate incremental 
but not drastic innovations. These results support our hypothesis that establishments face 
difficulties in using knowledge from areas they are not familiar with. The firms use spillovers 
primarily for innovations that are closely related to their existing activities. R&D cooperations 
help to some extent to solve the problems in using spillovers for drastic innovations.  
We do not find evidence that the firms’ own R&D efforts facilitate the use of external 
knowledge. According to our results they are rather substitutes. Establishments with high 
  
innovative activities are close to the frontier of technology and product development. Since 
they have less to learn from others, outside knowledge is of lower importance to them. 
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 1. Introduction 
Knowledge spillovers play a key role in economic development for several reasons. If the 
technological knowledge produced by individual firms spreads industry-wide, productivity 
throughout the whole industry is enhanced. Endogenous growth literature assumes that this 
implies an aggregate production function which exhibits increasing returns to scale allowing 
sustained long-run growth (Romer, 1986; Grossman and Helpman, 1990). Empirical research 
confirms that a substantial part of total productivity growth can be explained by inter- and 
intra-industry knowledge spillovers (Sena, 2004). 
Furthermore, spillovers may have an indirect impact on economic development as they 
influence the incentives to engage in innovative activities. The firm’s own innovations in turn 
influence both its productivity and profitability (Geroski, 1991; Geroski, Machin and Van 
Reenen, 1993; Hanel and St-Pierre, 2002). However, spillovers can weaken or strengthen the 
incentives to undertake innovative activities. If the knowledge accumulated in a firm spills 
over to other firms, the firm may under-invest in innovative activities as it is unable to fully 
appropriate returns from those activities (Arrow 1962). On the other hand, spillover effects 
may provide additional incentives to pursue own innovative projects if this enhances the 
absorptive capacity to assimilate and exploit existing knowledge from other firms. Following 
an influential paper by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), a widespread view is that a firm’s own 
R&D effort increases its absorptive capacity. 
Finally, the number of inter-firm strategic alliances increased dramatically during the 
1990s. R&D cooperations among firms are a substantial part of these alliances (Caloghirou, 
Ioannides and Vonortas, 2003). Starting with the seminal paper by d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988), a substantial theoretical literature has examined the impact of spillovers on 
such cooperations (de Bondt, 1996). While early contributions treated spillovers as exogenous 
determinants, recent analyses stress that the use of spillovers depends on whether or not firms 
form cooperative agreements (Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998; Kamien and Zang, 2000). 
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 Despite the generally recognized importance of knowledge spillovers, economic literature 
is essentially silent on the type of innovation stimulated by spillovers. To date, there has been 
almost no econometric study that examines whether or not a firm can use the knowledge from 
other firms for all kinds of innovations. In this paper, we consider product innovations 
differing in their degree of newness to the adopting firms. We investigate the impact of 
spillovers from rivals on these innovations. The core hypothesis tested is that firms face 
difficulties in applying knowledge that comes from areas they are not familiar with. 
Therefore, firms exploit spillovers for improving their products rather than for producing 
completely new products. Skills, experiences and abilities within a firm are required to 
assimilate and exploit outside information. Learning from rivals is less costly and time-
consuming if a firm already produces products which embody know-how related to the rivals’ 
knowledge. Furthermore, drastic product innovations often require a rather radical 
reorganization of production. Only modest changes within the firm are needed to launch 
incremental product innovations. Thus, using rivals’ knowledge for incremental innovations 
entails lower adjustment costs. This implies not only lower costs of technological investment 
but also a lesser degree of employee resistance against innovation and a less severe conflict 
between the firm’s new and its existing activities. 
Using an unusually rich data set on a sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany, 
we estimate the determinants of various types of innovation activities. Incremental product 
innovations are captured by follow-up products, qualitatively improved products and products 
with additional functions, while drastic innovation activities are captured by patent 
applications and the launch of completely new products. Controlling for a variety of other 
influences, we examine whether spillovers stimulate incremental or drastic innovations. We 
also investigate if a firm’s own R&D effort or cooperations in R&D facilitate the use of 
knowledge spillovers. Multivariate probit estimates show that knowledge spillovers from 
rivals have a positive impact on incremental innovations. This impact is largely independent 
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 of participation in R&D cooperations. Spillovers exert no independent influence on drastic 
innovation activities. The results support the hypothesis that establishments face difficulties in 
using knowledge that comes from areas they are not familiar with. Establishments exploit 
spillovers primarily for innovations that are closely related to their existing activities. The 
results also show that R&D cooperations to some extent help to overcome the difficulties in 
using spillovers for drastic innovations. Yet we do not find evidence that the firm’s own R&D 
effort facilitates the use of spillovers. Quite the contrary, our estimates show that own R&D 
effort and the use of outside knowledge are rather substitutive. This provides support for 
recent theoretical contributions by Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Eeckhout and 
Jovanovic (2002) and Knott (2003). Establishments with high R&D effort are closer to the 
frontier of technology and product development. Since they have less to learn from others, 
outside knowledge is less useful to them. In contrast, establishments with low R&D effort 
have to learn a lot from others. Thus, knowledge spillovers from rivals and the information 
exchange within R&D cooperations are more valuable to laggard establishments. 
Dewar and Dutton (1986) examine in a related study the determinants of incremental and 
radical process innovations. They do not find a significant association between exposure to 
external information and either type of process innovation. However, the study is limited to a 
very small sample of 40 footwear manufacturers in the United States. In contrast, a study by 
Peters and Becker (1998) shows that knowledge spillovers from competitors have an impact 
on the introduction of improved products but not on the introduction of completely new 
products. Our examination differs from this study in several respects. First, Peters and Becker 
provide no theoretical background to explain their result. The variable for knowledge 
spillovers is simply a control variable in their paper. Second, Peters and Becker’s analysis is 
restricted to the German automobile industry, while our sample covers establishments from 
the whole manufacturing sector. Third, our analysis is based on a more detailed differentiation 
of innovative activities including patenting. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we 
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 provide a detailed analysis of the role R&D plays in the use of knowledge spillovers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed discussion on 
the type of innovation that is stimulated by knowledge spillovers. Section 3 describes the data 
set and discusses variables and the estimation method. Section 4 presents the results of the 
empirical investigation, while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
2.1 Learning and Reorganization of Production 
Learning and the capabilities to learn are at the heart of innovative activities. Strategic 
management literature stresses that learning is predominantly cumulative and closely related 
to the firm’s previous activities. New knowledge builds upon experience accumulated in 
earlier periods. As past experience has a strong impact on a firm’s future activities, 
innovations usually take place as a succession of incremental changes. Major shifts and 
discontinuities are relatively rare. Teece et al. (1994, p. 17) argue that 
‘opportunities for successful new developments will be ‘close in’ to previous 
activities … This is because learning is a process of trial, feedback, and 
evaluation. If too many parameters are changed simultaneously, the ability of 
firms to conduct meaningful natural quasi experiments is attenuated. If many 
aspects of a firm’s learning environment change simultaneously, the ability to 
ascertain cause-effect relationships is confounded because cognitive structures 
will not be formed and rates of learning diminish as a result.’ 
This has a crucial implication for the use of knowledge spillovers. If the firm’s learning 
capabilities depend on its previous experiences, the firm will assimilate and exploit rivals’ 
knowledge closely related to its own products and processes. Learning from rivals is less 
costly and time-consuming when the firm already produces products which embody know-
how similar to that of their rivals. The most obvious case is that the transferred outside 
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 information is highly fragmentary and incomplete. Firms with related know-how will face 
less severe difficulties in filling the gaps than firms with rather unrelated experiences. But 
even if the rivals’ knowledge is completely disclosed, outside information will be less likely 
to be of use to firms which have no complementary knowledge to comprehend and assimilate 
it. Therefore, we anticipate that product innovations stimulated by knowledge spillovers from 
rivals are usually incremental rather than drastic. 
The reasoning has strong similarities to Spence’s (1981) analysis of interdependent 
learning curves. Spence assumes an individual firm’s unit cost function which is not only 
decreasing in the firm’s own output but also in total industry output. Moreover, he considers 
the complementarity between firm-specific experience and industry experience. The 
individual firm’s capacity to absorb industry experience is greater if it accumulates its own 
experience closely related to the know-how of other firms in the industry. An obvious 
extension is to apply the concept of interdependent learning curves not only to cost reductions 
but also to product innovations. Accumulated experience from producing similar products 
enhances a firm’s absorptive capacity to use rivals’ knowledge for incremental product 
innovations. 
This aspect becomes even more important if one takes into account that learning from 
competitors does not only refer to the attributes of a new product. As launching new products 
usually requires a reorganization of production, learning from rivals involves aspects of 
organizational change. The adopting firm must look for ways to adjust its production process. 
While incremental product innovations entail only modest changes, completely new products 
require more radical changes in routines and technologies. Furthermore, a radical 
reorganization of production may cause higher adjustment costs as it involves severe 
resistance to change from production and managerial employees (Ichniowski and Shaw, 1995; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).1 Competence-destroying change requires renewed effort and 
investments on the part of the employees. Moreover, superiors may fear that they will lose 
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 authority when a radical reorganization takes place. Workers may suspect that they will lose 
their jobs due to radical technological change. Therefore, learning how to restructure 
production and implementing organizational change are more difficult in the case of drastic 
product innovations. 
Furthermore, coherence of activities may play an important role in the firm’s strategy.2 
This also applies to its innovative activities. Implementing a completely new product may 
involve a severe conflict between the firm’s new and its old activities. The technology 
required to produce the drastic product innovation may interfere with the technology required 
to produce the firm’s established products. In that case, a reorganization of production does 
not only involve high technological investments or a high degree of employee resistance. It 
may impair the firm’s capabilities to pursue its existing activities. Similarly, the marketing 
strategy to successfully launch the drastic product innovation may interfere with the strategy 
for selling the firm’s other products. Learning ways to achieve coherence is easier if the firm 
launches an incremental product innovation which is more or less closely related to its 
existing activities. 
In summary, firms will normally use knowledge spillovers from rivals for incremental 
rather than for drastic product innovations. As firms face difficulties in using knowledge that 
comes from areas they are not familiar with, they are likely to exploit outside information for 
improving their products rather than for producing completely new products. Furthermore, 
incremental innovations entail only a moderate reorganization of production, a lower degree 
of worker resistance and a less severe conflict between the firm’s new and its old activities. 
One scenario is that a firm does not simply imitate rivals’ products but uses knowledge 
spillovers for developing its own products. In this case, knowledge spillovers stimulate 
incremental innovations that are new to both the firm and the market. The second scenario is 
that spillovers primarily serve the diffusion of new products across firms. In that case, a firm 
primarily exploits knowledge spillovers to imitate rivals’ products and, hence, to launch 
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 products which are only new to the adopting firm. Our hypothesis suggests that the firm will 
usually only imitate new products that are closely related to its old products. Taken into 
account the heterogeneity of adjustment costs among firms, a rival may launch a completely 
new product which is not imitated by other firms in the market.3 For example, new entrants 
may have relatively low costs of bringing drastic innovations to market while established 
firms may have prohibitively high adjustment costs preventing them from imitation. 
 
2.2 The Role of R&D and Cooperations in R&D 
R&D is an important input in the innovation process. Thus, one may argue that the link 
between spillovers and product innovations depends on the firm’s R&D activities. There are 
several reasons why R&D may play a role in the use of knowledge spillovers. 
First, spillovers from rivals might stimulate the firm’s R&D activities which in turn exert a 
positive impact on product innovations launched by the firm. If spillovers are primarily inputs 
in the firm’s R&D and no direct inputs in its innovation output, the association between 
spillovers and product innovations would be driven by spurred R&D activities. Yet if the 
firm’s learning capacity rather depends on the relatedness of its past and present activities to 
those of its rivals, there will be a direct association between the use of knowledge spillovers 
and the launch of incremental product innovations.4 The association between spillovers and 
incremental innovations will be at least partially independent of the firm’s R&D activities. In 
the extreme case, knowledge spillovers from rivals are important for the firm’s innovations 
even if they are no input in its R&D and hence do not influence R&D expenditures (Levin, 
1988). To test this, we run regressions without and with control variables for R&D. In case 
the link between spillovers and innovations is basically driven by spurred R&D activities, the 
inclusion of R&D variables should cause the coefficients on the spillover variable to 
attenuate. By contrast, if the link between spillovers and innovations is direct and independent 
of the firm’s R&D activities, the inclusion of those controls should not cause a substantial 
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 attenuation of the coefficients on the spillover variable. 
However if  a direct link exists between spillovers and innovations, the strength of this link 
may depend on the firm’s R&D activities. This brings us to the second possible role of R&D. 
In case R&D enhances the firm’s absorptive capacities, a positive interaction of R&D and the 
use of knowledge spillovers can be expected (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). This might apply 
to both incremental and drastic product innovations. The impact of spillovers on incremental 
innovations will be more pronounced if a firm’s own R&D strengthens the absorptive 
capacities created by activities that are related to those of the rivals. Insofar R&D enhances 
absorptive capacities to a substantial extent, firms with R&D might even use spillovers to 
launch drastic product innovations. 
Yet recent theoretical contributions by Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Eeckhout and 
Jovanovic (2002) and Knott (2003) highlight a diametrically opposed role played by a firm’s 
own R&D in the use of outside information. This role implies a negative interaction effect 
between R&D and the use of knowledge spillovers. The basic hypothesis is that knowledge 
spillovers from rivals are less valuable to firms which are at the frontier of technology and 
product development. The more a firm knows the less it has to learn from other firms. In 
contrast, firms which are far below the frontier of technology and product development have 
to learn a lot from other firms, specifically from those that are closer to the frontier. 
Therefore, knowledge spillovers from rivals are more valuable to laggard firms. A study by 
Knott, Wu and Posen (2004) provides empirical support for this hypothesis. Using data from 
firms in the US banking sector, their frontier analysis confirms that spillovers are asymmetric. 
Firms with a larger degree of technical inefficiency benefit more from spillovers. The 
theoretical implication of the hypothesis is a specialization of firms (Jovanovic and 
MacDonald, 1994; Eeckhout and Jovanovic, 2002).5 Some firms take a leadership role by 
investing in R&D and producing new knowledge. As they are operating at the frontier of 
technology and product development, rivals’ knowledge is less useful for their innovation 
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 activities. Other firms take a follower role. Instead of extensively investing in R&D, they 
specialize in learning from technological leaders. Leaders and followers can coexist if 
informational barriers imply that the diffusion of knowledge is incomplete. As discussed, 
firms will usually use knowledge spillovers from rivals for incremental rather than for drastic 
innovations. 
Furthermore, it is important to consider that firms undertaking R&D are often involved in 
R&D cooperations with other firms and institutions. To avoid confounding the influence of 
the firm’s own R&D expenditures and the influence of a participation in R&D cooperations, it 
is crucial to distinguish between both aspects in the theoretical and empirical analysis. It may 
be that R&D cooperations rather than the firm’s own R&D expenditures play a supportive 
role in the use of knowledge spillovers. Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) highlight this role 
of R&D cooperations. They show that participation in R&D consortia has a positive impact 
on the research productivity of Japanese firms. Part of this impact appears to arise from 
increased knowledge spillovers within the consortia. This finding supports the notion that 
R&D cooperations serve as a vehicle to improve voluntary or involuntary information flows 
and to get access to outside information. This may not only apply to cooperations with rivals. 
Even cooperations with suppliers, customers, universities or other research organizations can 
provide an improved access to rivals’ knowledge. This may also involve information about 
ways to reorganize production and to ensure coherence of the firm’s new and old activities. 
Therefore if R&D cooperations substantially help to improve learning, participating firms 
may use rivals’ knowledge even for drastic innovations. 
 
3. Data, Variables and Method 
3.1 Data Set 
The empirical investigation is based on the Hanover Panel, a four-wave panel with data from 
manufacturing establishments in the federal state of Lower Saxony.6 The population consists 
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 of all manufacturing establishments with five or more employees. The sample is stratified 
according to firm size and industry. Interviews were conducted by Infratest Sozialforschung, a 
professional survey and opinion research institute. The data were collected on the basis of a 
questionnaire in personal interviews with the owner, top manager or head of the personnel 
department. In the first wave of interviews (1994), which was financed by the Volkswagen 
Foundation, 51 percent of the establishments in the sample agreed to participate. In spite of 
this non-response rate the difference between the planned and realized stratification is so 
small that the data are representative of the manufacturing establishments in Lower Saxony in 
1994 and in the subsequent waves. The number of firms taking part in the panel study 
declined from 1025 (1994) to 849 (1995), 721 (1996) and 709 (1997).7
Apart from basic information on the establishment, a nucleus of themes was addressed 
annually. Additional topics were sampled in successive waves. Several questions needed for 
the construction of critical variables needed for this inquiry were only addressed to 
interviewees in the second and in the fourth wave. The estimates are based on pooled data for 
the years 1995 and 1997. Furthermore, the analysis is restricted to establishments generally 
developing new products. Only those establishments answered the question regarding the use 
of knowledge spillovers. 
Askildsen, Jirjahn and Smith (2006) have also used the data to study the determinants of 
environmental investments and innovations. Our paper differs in several respects from this 
earlier work. Though Askildsen, Jirjahn and Smith distinguish between several 
environmentally-friendly process innovations, they do not differentiate between incremental 
and drastic product innovations. In our study, we distinguish between various types of 
incremental and drastic product innovations. Furthermore, Askildsen, Jirjahn and Smith do 
not investigate the impact of spillovers on innovations. Investigating this impact is at the heart 
of our examination. 
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 3.2 Variables for Incremental and Drastic Product Innovations 
Table 1 presents the definitions of all variables used. The descriptive statistics are shown for 
the pooled sample of establishments. The data set is unique in that it offers a range of 
information about types of product innovations launched by the establishments in the 
respective year. Incremental product innovations are captured by dummy variables for the 
launch of follow-up products, FOLLPROD, products with improved quality, QUALPROD, and 
products with additional functions, FUNCPROD. In the pooled sample, there are about 33% of 
observations with follow-up products, 34% with qualitatively improved products, and 20% 
which launched products with additional functions. 
Drastic product innovations are captured by a dummy variable NEWPROD for the launch of 
completely new products. Finally, PATENT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment 
filed patents in the respective year. Investigating the determinants of patent applications helps 
to sharpen the interpretation of our results. As German law makes high demands on the 
novelty of patented products, this variable is closely related to drastic innovative activities. In 
the pooled sample, there are about 22% of observations with the introduction of completely 
new products, and 16% with patent applications. 
 
3.3 Variables for Spillovers and R&D 
The data set is also unique in that it provides a rich set of explanatory variables. This affords 
the opportunity to include not only indicators for establishment size, R&D, competition and 
market strategy but also variables for human resource management, industrial relations, 
technology and the structure of the workforce. 
Most importantly, the survey provides information on knowledge spillovers from rivals. 
The dummy variable RIVALIDEA is equal to 1, if the establishment observes competitors to get 
ideas for product development, and 0 otherwise. 45% of the establishments reported that they 
get innovative ideas by observing the actions of their competitors. Based on our theoretical 
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 considerations, we anticipate that spillovers from competitors will exert a positive impact on 
the variables for incremental product innovations but not on the variables for drastic product 
innovations. 
The data provide several alternative variables for R&D. RESEARCH is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the establishment engages in R&D, and 0 otherwise. Note that all establishments 
in the sample reported generally developing new products. But only 50% of these 
establishments engage in R&D. Innovative activities are often undertaken by firms even when 
they do not have institutionalized R&D (Kleinknecht, 1987; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1997). 
Yet, to the extent R&D reflects more systematic innovative activities and higher investments 
in those activities, we anticipate that R&D is an important input in the innovation process 
which exerts a positive impact on the innovation output. 
Alternatively, we use the proportion of employees involved in R&D, RESEARCHSTAFF, and 
a dummy, RESEARCHCOOP, equal to 1 if the establishment has R&D cooperations with other 
firms and institutions. This allows us to distinguish between the role of the establishment’s 
own research effort and the role of cooperations. Note that about 44% of all establishments 
are involved in R&D cooperations. Only 6% undertake R&D without a cooperation. 
To test if the association between R&D and innovations is direct or indirect, we run 
regressions with and without our R&D measures. If the association between spillovers and 
product innovations is driven by spurred R&D activities, the inclusion of R&D variables 
should cause the coefficients on the spillover variable to attenuate. If the link is direct and the 
establishment’s absorptive capacities basically depend on the relatedness of its activities to 
those of its rivals, there should be no substantial attenuation. Finally, we test if there are 
interaction effects between our key variables by including RESEARCHSTAFF*RIVALIDEA, 
RESEARCHCOOP*RIVALIDEA and RESEARCHSTAFF*RESEARCHCOOP. 
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 3.4 Control Variables 
Empirical and theoretical analyses indicate that managers play a very important role in the 
firm’s innovation activities. Harhoff (1999) finds that innovative activities of firms are 
influenced by the education of the firms’ managers. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) show that 
innovative activities are influenced by the separation of ownership and control. To control for 
managers supporting innovation activities, we include a dummy variable, MANAGERIDEA, 
equal to 1 if ideas from executive managers or owners of the establishment play an important 
role in developing new products. 
Several variables capture the market strategy of the establishment. MARKETINGIDEA is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if ideas from the establishment’s marketing department play an 
important role in developing products. CUSTOMERIDEA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if ideas 
from customers play an important role in developing products. Both variables reflect an active 
strategy of looking for new market opportunities via systematic market research or direct 
communication with customers. Responding to changing customer demands with innovative 
activities and entering markets with new products is at the heart of this strategy. 
Furthermore, we include a variable for the establishment’s relationship to its customers. 
CUSTOMERSPECIALIZE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment concentrates on a 
particular customer group. On the one hand, an establishment may have an incentive to 
develop new products that meet the specific needs of this customer group. On the other hand, 
the incentives to engage in innovative activities may be reduced if the establishment 
concentrates on customers with substantial buyer market power (Peters, 2000). 
SALESMAINPRODUCT is a variable for the percentage of sales attributed to the main product 
group. This variable is an inverse measure of a multiproduct establishment. A high degree of 
product diversity enables the establishment to diversify risk. Nelson (1959) argues that this 
enhances its willingness to undertake innovative activities. Therefore, we anticipate a negative 
association between the percentage of sales attributed to the main product group and the 
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 establishment’s innovations. 
Two variables capture competition among firms in the product market. PRESSURE is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if managers answered that the pressure from competitors is very 
high, and 0 otherwise. EXPORT is the percentage of the establishment’s sales generated by 
exports. A widespread view is that product market competition provides incentives to 
improve efficiency within firms. This may also include increased innovativeness. However, 
theoretical analyses show that competition may increase or decrease the efficiency of firms. 
On the one hand, competition may imply a threat of liquidation which induces efficiency-
enhancing investments in order to reduce the probability of bankruptcy (Schmidt, 1997). On 
the other hand, product market competition reduces the incentives to engage in innovative 
activities in case a shrinkage effect dominates (Martin, 1993). While a greater number of 
competitors increases industry output, the sales potential of each individual firm decreases. 
Similarly, Boone (2000) argues that product market competition involves a discouragement 
effect when a firm faces superior competitors. Moreover, increased competition may involve 
an increased probability that a firm’s own innovations are imitated by other firms. Innovation 
incentives decrease if the firm is less likely to be able to appropriate the returns from its 
innovative activities. 
The survey provides information related to the flexibility of the establishments on 
implementing new products. The variable TEAM indicates that at least 10% of blue-collar 
workers in the establishment are organized in production teams with expanded autonomy and 
multiple responsibilities. An organization of work characterized by reduced specialization, 
multi-tasking and horizontal communication is a crucial element of the concept of flexible 
production (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). The opportunity to use labor in a more versatile 
way may facilitate innovation activities (Laursen and Foss, 2003). 
Profit sharing for employees, PROFITSHARING, is also taken into account. Profit sharing has 
been thought to provide incentives for helping on the job and to induce cooperation both 
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 among employees and between management and employees (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987). Such 
cooperative relations may be needed whenever innovative changes are implemented. Further, 
profit sharing provides incentives for multi-tasking (Jirjahn, 2000). These incentives are 
crucial if a change of products requires the switch from one task to another. 
Employees having a better understanding of the production process may be important for 
the implementation of new products. Nickell and Nicolitsas (2000) provide evidence for an 
association between the availability of human capital on the one hand and the rate of 
accumulation of knowledge capital on the other. We capture the employees’ initial human 
capital by two variables. The proportion of blue-collar workers, BLUECOLLAR, is generally 
recognized as a proxy for a less qualified workforce (Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998). In 
contrast, the proportion of university and college graduates, UNIVERSITY, is a measure of 
highly qualified white-collar employees. 
TRAINING is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment finances continuous training 
for the employees. New products may involve new qualification requirements. Thus, product 
innovations may contribute to the obsolescence of the employees’ initial qualifications. 
Continuous training enables employees to cope with new qualification requirements (Gerlach 
and Jirjahn, 2001). Therefore, further training provided by the employer complements the 
establishment’s innovation activities. 
Industrial relations may also play a role in the firm’s innovativeness. The link between 
unionization and innovations has been extensively examined with Anglo-Saxon data 
(Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van Reenen, 1998). However, German industrial relations are 
characterized by a dual structure of employee representation with both works councils and 
unions (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003). Works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for 
establishment-level participation, while collective bargaining agreements are usually 
negotiated between unions and employers’ associations on an industrial level. 
Works councils are elected by the workforce of establishments with five or more 
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 employees, although their creation depends on the initiative of the establishment’s employees. 
Hence, they are not present in all eligible establishments. Works councils may play a role in 
building trustful industrial relations within establishments (Freeman and Lazear, 1995; 
Askildsen, Jirjahn and Smith, 2006). Employees may refuse cooperation when an employer 
cannot credibly commit to take their interests into account. If information about potentially 
performance-enhancing innovations is in the hand of the employees, they may not wish to 
reveal it for fear that the employer might use the information to their disadvantage. Providing 
works councils with codetermination rights is one possible way to protect the interests of the 
workforce and to cooperatively realize mutual gains for the employees and the owners of the 
firm. If a council improves the information flow within the establishment, it can be expected 
that this will provide management with ideas about incremental improvements of products 
(Smith, 1994). In the regressions, the presence of a works councils, WORKSCOUNCIL, is taken 
into account. 
We also include an indicator COLLECTBARGAIN of whether the establishment is covered by 
a collective agreement. Given the degree of centralization of collective bargaining in 
Germany, it is not likely that collective bargaining can take a similar role for innovations like 
establishment codetermination. Centralized collective bargaining rather might impose 
restrictions on the establishments’ flexibility.8 This would imply a negative association 
between the coverage by a collective agreement and innovations. 
Economies of scale are captured by SIZE, the number of employees in the establishment. In 
order to take into account a non-linear impact of firm size, its square, SIZESQUARED, is also 
included. An additional measure of economies of scale is a dummy, SHIFTWORK, equal to 1, if 
the establishment uses shift work. 
Further, a variable for technological opportunities is included. TECHNEW is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the establishment uses a state-of-the-art production technology. The 
proportion of women, WOMEN, is also included. Since women are thought to work in more 
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 service-oriented industrial groups, this variable may reflect modes of production that are not 
typical for the traditional manufacturing industry. If these modes of production are 
characterized by a greater innovativeness, there will be a positive association between the 
share of women and product innovations. Finally, to control for varying technologies across 
industries, variables for 12 broadly defined industrial groups in the manufacturing sector are 
included. 
 
3.4 Estimation Method 
As our five dependent innovation variables are binary, we use a multivariate probit model.9 
This model is a generalization of the bivariate probit model (see Greene, 2003). In principle, 
the method is similar to the SUR model. The basic probit model is extended by allowing for 
correlated disturbances in a similar way as it is done by the seemingly unrelated regression 
framework. However, the estimation procedure is much more complicated. Let  denote the 
decision of establishment i to launch innovation type m (m = 1,…,5). The decision is defined 
by 
imy
     ⎩⎨
⎧ >= otherwise 0,
 0,* if ,1 im
im
yy
with the latent model 
     imimmimy ε+= xβ'*
where  is the vector of establishment characteristics,  the vector of coefficients and imx mβ imε  
the error term. The error terms of the innovation decisions are assumed to be jointly five 
variate normally distributed with zero mean. Given that the variances of the error terms are 
equal to 1, the variance-covariance matrix is 
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where the subindices indicate the innovation decisions to which the covariance refers. If the 
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 error terms of the innovation decisions are not correlated, the five innovation equations could 
be estimated separately. In our study the equations are estimated simultaneously using a 
multivariate probit model. This gives the opportunity to test whether or not the correlations 
are actually different from zero. The log-likelihood function, lnL, for the multivariate probit 
model is 
     ∑
=
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     ),... ,( 555111 iiiii qq xβxβμ
''=
and . Therefore,  if 12 −= imim yq 1=imq 1=imy  and 1−=imq  if . The symmetric 
matrix 
0=imy
*Σ  is given by  
     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
1
1
*
5115
1551
L
MOM
L
σ
σ
ii
ii
qq
qq
Σ
The practical obstacle in estimating a multivariate probit model is the evaluation of the high-
order multivariate normal integrals. Therefore, the multivariate standard normal distribution is 
evaluated using a simulation method based on the Geweke-Hajivasiliou-Keane simulator. 
This method exploits the fact that a multivariate normal distribution function can be expressed 
as the product of sequentially conditioned univariate normal distribution functions, which can 
be evaluated more easily. The possible combinations of the outcomes (  or ) are 
represented by their probabilities, and this is exemplified by the case that all endogenous 
variables are equal to one: 
1=imy 0=imy
  =  )1...Pr( 51 === ii yy ),,,,Pr( 555444333222111 iiiiiiiiii xβxβxβxβxβ ''''' ≤≤≤≤≤ εεεεε
Given that an analytical solution is intractable, the probability is approximated through 
simulation. The idea of the GHK simulator is to deal with the error terms sequentially and to 
solve the difficulty by recursive simulation in order to break a complicated situation into 
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 relatively simple components. The probability )1...Pr( 51 === ii yy  can be written as the 
product of one unconditional and four conditional probabilities according to: 
    )1...Pr( 51 === ii yy  =  
  ) |Pr(*)Pr( 111222111 iiiiii xβxβxβ
''' ≤≤≤ εεε ), |Pr(* 111222333 iiiiii xβxβxβ ''' ≤≤≤ εεε
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The general methodology is a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix for the errors 
    ΓΓ'εε' =)(E  
where  is the lower triangular Cholesky matrix with the elements Γ mjγ . In the first place the 
unconditional probability  is computed by drawing the random observations  
from the standard normal distribution  subject to the constraint 
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Based on this drawing the probability )/( 11111 γX'βΦ=Q  is calculated. In the next step 
recursively the random variables  are drawn from  subject to the condition (the 
truncation points) 
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 is computed and the product  is 
calculated. The advantage of these calculations is the fact that the e’s are independent normal 
distributed random variables and hence the probability which we want to evaluate can 
equivalently be expressed as a product of independent univariate cumulative density 
functions. This procedure is repeated another S-1 times and the average is the simulation of 
the probability in question: 
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 All other probabilities can be computed similarly. After inserting them into the likelihood 
function, standard maximization procedures can be used in order to estimate the parameters of 
interest. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Initial Regression Results 
Our initial estimates without controls for R&D and cooperations in R&D are shown in Table 
2. With only one exception, the estimated correlation coefficients between the error terms are 
highly significant. This confirms that unobserved random determinants influence the several 
types of innovation in the same direction. 
Many of the explanatory variables are statistically significant and take coefficients of the 
expected sign. A supportive managerial environment has a positive influence on both 
incremental and drastic innovations. Ideas from executive managers or owners increase the 
probability of qualitatively improved products, products with additional functions and 
completely new products. 
The skills of the workforce play a positive role in innovation activities. Establishments 
financing further training for their employees are more likely to file patents and to launch 
qualitatively improved products, products with additional functions and completely new 
products. The probability of patent applications increases with the proportion of university 
and college graduates. The share of blue-collar workers as an inverse measure of skills 
decreases the probability of both follow-up products and patent applications. The share of 
women is positively associated with qualitatively improved products and completely new 
products. Although we have controlled for line of business, the positive association between 
the gender composition of the workforce and innovations may reflect the sorting of women 
into more service-oriented establishments within the manufacturing sector. 
Profit sharing is a positive determinant of patent applications. Establishments with self-
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 managed production teams are more likely to launch products with additional functions and 
completely new products. This positive association between teams and innovations supports 
the notion that flexible production facilitates a change of products. Yet teams are negatively 
associated with patent applications. An explanation may be that flexible production aims at 
speedy responses to changing market demands. As it usually takes several years till a patent is 
granted, establishments with flexible production may prefer incremental or drastic product 
innovations they can directly launch without patent protection. 
Turning to the variables for industrial relations, the estimates show that collective 
bargaining and establishment-level codetermination play different roles. Coverage by a 
collective bargaining agreement is negatively associated with both incremental and drastic 
innovation activities. This may be explained by the restrictions centralized collective 
bargaining imposes on the establishments’ flexibility. The presence of a works council has a 
positive influence on two types of incremental product innovation but no influence on our 
measures of drastic innovation activities. The positive influence of works councils supports 
the notion that establishment-level codetermination facilitates innovations by building trustful 
employer-employee relationships and improving the information flow within the 
establishment. This particularly appears to facilitate incremental innovations. 
The variables for the scale of production are positive determinants of innovation activities. 
Establishment size increases the probability of follow-up products, qualitatively improved 
products and products with additional functions, but at a decreasing rate. There is also a 
positive link between the size of the establishment and patent applications. Shift work is a 
positive determinant of follow-up products, completely new products and patent applications. 
Establishments operating under strong competitive pressure are less likely to launch both 
qualitatively improved and completely new products. Competitive pressure may imply a 
decreased sales potential and, hence, a shrinkage effect decreasing the incentives to undertake 
innovations. In contrast, the percentage of sales generated by exports exerts a positive 
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 influence on qualitatively improved products, products with additional functions and patent 
applications. A high export share may reflect a high international sales potential, stimulating 
innovative activities. 
Specialization to one main product group tends to decrease innovation activities. The 
percentage of sales attributed to the main product group has a negative influence on follow-up 
products and completely new products. A low degree of product diversity and, hence, a low 
degree of risk diversification may reduce the incentive to innovate. Further, establishments 
are less likely to launch qualitatively improved products and to file patents if they specialize 
for a particular customer group. This market strategy may increase the dependence on 
customers with substantial buyer market power and, hence, result in decreased innovation 
incentives. 
An active strategy of looking for new market opportunities via systematic market research 
or direct communication with customers has a positive influence on incremental product 
innovations but no influence on drastic innovation activities. Ideas from the establishment’s 
marketing department increase the probability of follow-up products, qualitatively improved 
products and products with additional functions. Ideas from customers increase the 
probability of follow-up products and qualitatively improved products. The estimates show no 
statistically significant influence of active market research and communication with 
customers on patent applications or the launch of completely new products. This is a first hint 
that establishments use outside information for incremental rather than for drastic innovations. 
Of primary importance, knowledge spillovers from competitors have an influence on 
incremental product innovations but no influence on drastic innovations. The estimates show 
a statistically significant association between the use of knowledge spillovers and two types 
of incremental innovations, namely follow-up products and qualitatively improved products. 
In contrast, the estimates show no significant association between the use of knowledge 
spillovers and our variables for drastic innovation activities. Altogether, these results provide 
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 evidence for our basic hypothesis. Establishments use spillovers from rivals primarily for 
incremental product innovations. 
 
4.2 The Influence of R&D 
The estimates shown in Table 2 do not control for the establishments’ research activities. To 
test if the pattern of results changes, we take a further step and expand the specification by 
including variables for R&D. In Table 3, we include a simple dummy variable for R&D. We 
only report the coefficients on the R&D dummy and on the spillover variable. All of the other 
control variables listed in Table 2 are included in the regression but are suppressed to save 
space. The R&D variable performs strongly. It has a statistically significant influence on all 
five innovation measures. Importantly, the inclusion of this variable does not change the role 
of knowledge spillovers from rivals. 
The simple R&D variable may confound the influence of the establishment’s own R&D 
effort and the influence of participating in R&D cooperations. To distinguish between both 
influences, we replace the R&D dummy with the proportion of employees involved in R&D 
and a dummy variable for R&D cooperations. The results are shown in Table 4. The 
proportion of employees involved in R&D has only a significant influence on the introduction 
of completely new products. The participation in R&D cooperations is a statistically 
significant determinant of all five innovation measures. This suggests that R&D cooperations 
indeed provide opportunities for a very intensive and systematic exchange of information. 
However, even the inclusion of the two alternative R&D measures does not alter the earlier 
pattern of results. Knowledge spillovers from rivals have a positive influence on incremental 
innovations but no influence on drastic innovations. 
 
4.3 Interaction Effects 
The pattern of influences may partially remain obscured until interaction effects between our 
key variables have been considered. Taking the final step, we additionally include three 
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 interaction variables, namely spillovers interacted with R&D cooperations, spillovers 
interacted with the share of R&D employees, and R&D cooperations interacted with the share 
of R&D employees.10 In Table 5a, we use the same specification for the different innovation 
types by including all three interaction variables in each innovation equation. In Table 5b, we 
remove insignificant interaction variables (with a T-statistic smaller than one) from some 
innovation equations. While it improves the statistical significance of individual coefficients, 
this sensitivity test basically confirms the results of Table 5a. 
Indeed, the final estimates show that the influences of a firm’s own R&D effort and R&D 
cooperations with others can only be disentangled by including the interaction variables. The 
share of employees involved in R&D now emerges as a statistically significant determinant of 
four types of innovation. It not only influences the introduction of completely new products 
but also patent applications (in Table 5b) and the launch of products with improved quality 
and additional functions. Cooperation in R&D remains a statistically significant determinant 
of four types of innovation. 
The estimates reveal a negative interaction effect of the establishment’s R&D staff and its 
participation in R&D cooperations on all three types of incremental innovation. The negative 
interaction effect implies that the positive influence of R&D cooperations is stronger if the 
establishment has a smaller share of research employees.11 This finding provides support for 
the hypothesis that own R&D effort and the use of outside information are rather substitutes. 
Establishments with high R&D effort are closer to the frontier of product development. Since 
they have less to learn from others, information sharing within the R&D cooperation is less 
useful, particularly for their incremental innovation activities. In contrast, the improved 
information exchange within a cooperative R&D arrangement is more valuable to 
establishments with low R&D effort. Those establishments are likely to be far away from the 
frontier of product development. Hence, they have to learn a lot from others. 
Turning to our explanatory variable of primary interest, knowledge spillovers continue to 
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 be no significant determinant of patent applications. The finding supports our hypothesis that 
firms face difficulties in using rivals’ knowledge for drastic innovation activities. The 
interactions of spillovers with R&D cooperations and with the share of R&D employees are 
also statistically insignificant. This suggests that neither own R&D effort nor the improved 
information flow within cooperations can help to overcome the difficulties in exploiting 
rivals’ knowledge for their own patent activities. 
There also continues to be no statistically significant association between the spillover 
variable and the launch of completely new products. The finding provides further support for 
the hypothesis that firms face difficulties in using knowledge spillovers for drastic 
innovations. However, the estimates show a significantly positive interaction effect of 
spillovers and R&D cooperations on the launch of completely new products. At least for some 
types of drastic innovation activities, it appears that R&D cooperations help to overcome the 
difficulties in using rivals’ knowledge. This may involve products new to the adopting firm 
but not entirely new to the market. Own R&D effort does not facilitate the use of knowledge 
spillovers. Quite the contrary, the interaction of spillovers and the establishment’s R&D staff 
emerges as a significantly negative determinant of launching completely new products. This 
supports the notion that R&D effort and the use of rivals’ knowledge are substitutes. 
Turning to the variables for incremental innovations, the positive association between the 
spillover variable and the launch of follow-up products continues to be statistically 
significant. The interactions of knowledge spillovers with the share of R&D employees and 
with R&D cooperations are insignificant. Thus, using rivals’ knowledge for follow-up 
products is independent of the establishment’s R&D activities. Altogether, the results on 
follow-up products support our basic hypothesis. It is easier for firms to use rivals’ knowledge 
for incremental innovations closely related to the establishment’s experiences and activities. 
Obviously, related activities enhance the establishment’s absorptive capacity independently of 
its own R&D effort or R&D cooperations with others. 
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 We obtain a very similar conclusion regarding products with additional functions. In our 
final estimates, knowledge spillovers from rivals emerge as a significantly positive 
determinant of launching products with additional functions. There is no statistically 
significant interaction between knowledge spillovers and R&D cooperations. This provides 
further support for our basic hypothesis. Establishments particularly use knowledge spillovers 
for innovative activities in areas they are familiar with. Again, this holds independently of 
R&D cooperations. Moreover, the results on products with additional functions confirm that 
own R&D effort does not facilitate the use of spillovers. Quite the contrary, there is a 
significantly negative interaction effect of knowledge spillovers and R&D cooperations on 
this type of incremental innovation. This suggests a substitutive relationship between own 
R&D effort and the use of rivals’ knowledge. Spillovers are more valuable to laggard firms 
which are far below the frontier of product development, whereas firms operating at the 
frontier of product development have less to learn from others. 
While the estimates on follow-up products and products with additional functions show no 
significant interaction between R&D cooperations and spillovers, the interaction of R&D 
cooperations and spillovers turns out to be a significantly positive determinant of launching 
qualitatively improved products. This indicates that R&D cooperations in some instances also 
facilitate using spillovers for incremental innovative activities. Yet taken together, the results 
on our three measures of incremental innovation suggest that using spillovers for incremental 
innovation activities is to a substantial degree independent of R&D cooperations. Finally, the 
estimates show no significant interaction effect of spillovers and own R&D effort on the 
launch of qualitatively improved products. Thus, the estimates on qualitatively improved 
products also provide no evidence that a firm’s own R&D effort facilitates the use of 
knowledge spillovers. 
To summarize, even when controlling for possible interaction effects between our key 
variables, the estimates support our core hypothesis. Establishments face difficulties in using 
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 knowledge that comes from areas they are not familiar with. Therefore, establishments use 
spillovers for incremental rather than for drastic product innovations. The estimates on patent 
applications and completely new products show no independent influence of knowledge 
spillovers. An interaction of spillovers with R&D cooperations emerges as a significantly 
positive determinant of completely new products whereas it is no significant determinant of 
patent applications. R&D cooperations facilitate using spillovers for some but not for all 
drastic innovations. Yet, without R&D cooperations establishments do not appear to be able 
to exploit spillovers for drastic innovation activities. These results can be contrasted with the 
estimates on our three measures of incremental innovation. While the interaction of spillovers 
and R&D cooperations emerges as a significant determinant of qualitatively improved 
products, the positive influence of spillovers on follow-up products and products with 
additional functions is independent of a cooperation in R&D. Related experiences and 
activities enable establishments to use rivals’ knowledge for incremental product innovations. 
Two of three types of incremental innovation provide evidence that this does not depend on 
R&D cooperations. 
Furthermore, our results support recent theoretical contributions by Jovanovic and 
MacDonald (1994), Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002) and Knott (2003). These contributions 
hypothesize that own R&D effort and the use of outside information are substitutive. 
Research-intensive firms operating at the frontier of product development have less to learn 
from other firms. In contrast, less research-intensive firms, that are far below the frontier, 
have a lot to learn from others. The estimates show a negative interaction of the share of R&D 
employees with both R&D cooperations and the use of knowledge spillovers. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Though knowledge spillovers play a widely recognized role in economic development, little 
attention has been paid to the innovation types stimulated by spillovers. This study provides 
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 evidence that firms exploit knowledge spillovers from rivals primarily for incremental 
product innovations which are closely related to the firms’ already existing products. The 
finding highlights the crucial role of learning by doing. Other things equal, a firm has a higher 
absorptive capacity if it produces products that embody experience and know-how related to 
the rivals’ knowledge. As firms face difficulties in assimilating knowledge from areas they 
are not familiar with, spillovers are not normally used for drastic product innovations. 
However, R&D cooperations help to some degree to use spillovers even for drastic 
innovations. This indicates that R&D cooperations indeed provide opportunities for a very 
intensive and systematic exchange of information. This exchange of information has not only 
a direct positive impact on innovations but also an indirect influence by facilitating the use of 
knowledge spillovers. 
Finally, our study highlights that it is important to distinguish between R&D cooperations 
and the firm’s own R&D effort. While own R&D effort is an important input to the 
innovation process, our results do not provide evidence that it supports the use of outside 
information. Quite the contrary, there appear to be substitutive relationships between own 
R&D effort and both R&D cooperations and the use of knowledge spillovers. This indicates 
that research-intensive firms take a leading role in producing new knowledge. As they are 
operating at the frontier of product development, they have less to learn from others. Less 
research-intensive firms take a follower role. They specialize in learning from leaders and 
particularly adopt knowledge from the frontier which is useful for incremental innovations. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description (mean, standard deviation) 
FOLLPROD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment launched follow-up products (.330, .470). 
QUALPROD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment launched qualitatively improved products 
(.337, .473). 
FUNCPROD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment launched products with additional 
functions (.202, .401). 
NEWPROD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment launched completely new products (.223, 
.417). 
PATENT Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment filed patents (.160, .367) 
RIVALIDEA Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment normally gets its ideas for product 
innovations from observing competitors (.455, .498). 
RESEARCH Dummy variable equal to 1 if R&D is institutionalized in the establishment (.501, .500). 
RESEARCHSTAFF Employees involved in R&D as a proportion of total employees (.031, .053). 
RESEARCHCOOP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment has R&D cooperations with other firms 
or institutions (.436, .496). 
RESEARCHSTAFF*RESEARCHCOOP RESEARCHSTAFF interacted with RESEARCHCOOP (.0263, .050) 
RESEARCHSTAFF*RIVALIDEA RESEARCHSTAFF interacted with RIVALIDEA (.015, .040) 
RESEARCHCOOP*RIVALIDEA RESEARCHCOOP interacted with RIVALIDEA (.235, .424) 
MANAGERIDEA Dummy variable equal to 1 if ideas from executive managers or establishment owners 
play an important role in developing products (.519, .500). 
MARKETINGIDEA Dummy variable equal to 1 if ideas from the establishment’s marketing department play 
an important role in developing products (.193, .395). 
CUSTOMERIDEA Dummy variable equal to 1 if ideas from customers play an important role in developing 
products (.788, .409). 
CUSTOMERSPECIALIZE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment concentrates on a particular customer 
group (.297, .457). 
SALESMAINPRODUCT Ordered variable for the percentage of sales attributed to the main product group; 1 = less 
than 20%, . . ., 5 = at least 80% (3.75, 1.19). 
PRESSURE Dummy variable equal to 1 if management feels that the pressure by competitors is very 
high (.585, .493). 
EXPORT Percentage of the establishment’s sales generated by exports (14.94, 21.20). 
TEAM Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least 10% of the blue-collar workers in the establishment 
are organized in production teams with expanded autonomy and multiple responsibilities 
(.349, .477). 
PROFITSHARING Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment provides profit sharing to employees 
other than executives (.169, .375). 
BLUECOLLAR Blue-collar workers as a proportion of total employees (.621, .186). 
UNIVERSITY University and college graduates as a proportion of total employees (.036, .049). 
TRAINING Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment finances continuous training for the 
employees (.578, .494). 
WORKSCOUNCIL Dummy variable equal to 1 if a works council is present in the establishment (.585, .493). 
COLLECTBARGAIN Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement (.661, .473). 
SIZE Total employees in the establishment (164.06, 558.71). 
SIZESQUARED Total employees in the establishment squared 
SHIFTWORK Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment uses shift work (.440, .497). 
TECHNEW Dummy variable equal to 1 if the production technology is of the most recent vintage 
(.347, .476). 
WOMEN Women as a proportion of total employees (.288, .232). 
1996 Time dummy for 1996 (.469, .499). 
INDUSTRYDUMMIES Dummy variables for 14 broad industrial groups in the manufacturing sector. 
Observations 1022 
 
 Table 2: Initial Regression Results without Control Variables for R&D and Cooperations in R&D; Method: Multivariate Probit 
Dependent Variable       FOLLPROD           QUALPROD         FUNCPROD         NEWPROD            PATENT 
Explanatory Variable βˆ  |t| βˆ  |t| βˆ  |t| βˆ  |t| βˆ  |t| 
RIVALIDEA .2199 (2.43)** .2425 (2.62)*** .0942 (0.95) -.0243 (0.25) -.0705 (0.61) 
MANAGERIDEA .1048 (1.17) .2355 (2.58)** .2732 (2.76)*** .2762 (2.86)*** .1001 (0.88) 
MARKETINGIDEA .3367 (2.96)*** .1951 (1.66)* .3269 (2.61)*** .1446 (1.19) .1785 (1.31) 
CUSTOMERIDEA .2894 (2.56)** .2877 (2.51)** .1282 (1.00) .0569 (0.47) .2345 (1.40) 
CUSTOMERSPECIALIZE -.0433 (0.45) -.2072 (2.04)** -.0563 (0.52) -.1127 (1.09) -.2165 (1.70)* 
SALESMAINPRODUCT -.1206 (3.26)*** -.0321 (0.87) -.0011 (0.03) -.1082 (2.74)*** -.0056 (0.13) 
PRESSURE -.1359 (1.53) -.2002 (2.19)** -.0987 (0.98) -.2147 (2.27)** -.1527 (1.32) 
EXPORT .0019 (0.80) .0080 (3.40)*** .0043 (1.78)* .0018 (0.74) .0092 (3.46)*** 
TEAM -.0774 (0.84) .1022 (1.08) .2099 (2.02)** .2560 (2.63)*** -.2849 (2.33)** 
PROFITSHARING .1268 (1.11) .0948 (0.85) .0787 (0.64) .1192 (0.99) .3295 (2.44)** 
BLUECOLLAR -.6072 (2.36)** -.4030 (1.52) -.2581 (0.84) .0412 (0.14) -.8784 (2.46)** 
UNIVERSITY .6740 (0.64) -.0912 (0.08) -.5302 (0.47) -.8788 (0.84) 1.8056 (1.71)* 
TRAINING .0054 (0.05) .2175 (2.10)** .2327 (2.08)** .1914 (1.75)* .2818 (2.20)** 
WORKSCOUNCIL .2264 (1.93)* .0956 (0.80) .4672 (3.60)*** .0751 (0.61) -.0661 (0.44) 
COLLECTBARGAIN -.1785 (1.71)* -.0758 (0.72) -.2750 (2.30)** -.1819 (1.66)* -.3379 (2.53)** 
SIZE .0009 (2.62)*** .0009 (3.63)*** .0005 (2.00)** -2⋅10-5 (0.08) .0010 (2.12)** 
SIZESQUARED -9⋅10-8 (1.97)** -7⋅10-8 (4.06)*** -4⋅10-8 (2.22)** -2⋅10-8 (0.39) -2⋅10-7 (1.05) 
SHIFTWORK .2300 (2.02)** .1199 (1.08) .1557 (1.26) .2060 (1.71)* .6469 (4.50)*** 
TECHNEW -.0359 (0.38) .0252 (0.27) .0846 (0.83) -.1072 (1.06) .1263 (1.10) 
WOMEN .3593 (1.53) .7082 (2.73)*** -.1097 (0.39) .7441 (2.92)*** -.1793 (0.56) 
1996 .0104 (0.12) .1056 (1.20) .1034 (1.09) .0932 (1.00) .0004 (0.00) 
CONSTANT -.7126 (2.08)** -1.6989 (4.75)*** -1.7951 (4.65)*** -1.2625 (3.24)*** -1.3587 (3.08)*** 
INDUSTRYDUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LogL -2259.52 
Correlation of Error Terms Rho21 = .6051 (14.72)***, Rho31 = .4097 (7.73)***, Rho41 = .2148 (3.88)***, Rho51 = .1455 (2.17)**, Rho32 = .4805 (10.10)***,  
Rho42 = .1955 (3.56)***, Rho52 = .0231 (0.37), Rho43 = .2388 (4.30)***, Rho53 = .1723 (2.55)**, Rho54 = .1855 (2.65)***  
Observations 1022 
Robust T-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level. **Statistically significant at the .05 level. ***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
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Table 3: Regression Results with a Control Variable for R&D; Method: Multivariate Probit 
    FUNCPROD         NEWPROD         PATENT Dependent Variable        FOLLPROD      QUALPROD 
Explanator ˆ |t| ˆ |t| y Variable β  β  βˆ  |t| βˆ  |t| |t| 
(2.29)** .2333 (2.50)** .77) -.0538 (0.25) -.0882 (0.75) 
βˆ  
RIVALIDEA .2084 .0773 (0
RESEARCH .4097 (3.87)***  ** ** ** 
26 
.4700 (4.42)*** .4873 (4.03)* .5926 (5.06)* .8671 (5.86)*
LogL -2217.
Correlation of Error Terms 5980 (14.24)***, Rho31 = .3941 (7.34)***, Rho41 = .1910 (3.36)***, Rho51 = .1152 (1.55), Rho32 = .4685 (9.58)***,  
Observations 
Rho21 = .
Rho42 = .1696 (3.01)***, Rho52 = -.0332 (0.50), Rho43 = .2163 (3.81)***, Rho53 = .1385 (1.97)**, Rho54 = .1046 (1.44)  
1022 
Note that all of the other control v s listed in Table 2 are included but are suppressed to save space. Robust T-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level. 
able 4: Regression Results with Control Variables for Research Cooperations and R&D Intensity; Method: Multivariate Probit 
ROD         PATENT 
ariable
**Statistically significant at the .05 level. ***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
 
 
T
Dependent Variable    FOLLPROD      QUALPROD     FUNCPROD         NEWP
Explanator | | ˆ |t| ˆ |t  y Variable βˆ  t β  β  | βˆ  |t| |t| 
.2 8 25)** .2305 46)** 47) -.0 26 34) -.0870 4) 
βˆ  
RIVALIDEA 04 (2. (2. .0616 (0. 3 (0. (0.7
RESEARCHCOOP   **  ** 
  *  
1 
 .4211 (3.68)*** .4530 (3.96)*** .3788 (2.96)* .2388 (1.93)* .7189 (5.02)*
RESEARCHSTAFF -.5942 (0.56) -.2016 (0.18) 1.0605 (0.87) 3.5186 (3.00)** 1.0441 (0.93) 
LogL -2219.7
Correlation of Error Terms 5949 (14.10)***, Rho31 = .3974 (7.38)***, Rho41 = .2092 (3.71)***, Rho51 = .1128 (1.57), Rho32 = .4696 (9.63)***,  
Observations 
Rho21 = .
Rho42 = .1825 (3.26)***, Rho52 = -.0280 (0.43), Rho43 = .2238 (3.95)***, Rho53 = .1297 (1.87)*, Rho54 = .1235 (1.66)*  
1022 
Note that all of the other control v s listed in Table 2 are included but are suppressed to save space. Robust T-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level. 
able 5a: Regression Results with Control Variables for Research Cooperations, R&D Intensity and Interaction Effects; Method: Multivariate Probit 
ariable
**Statistically significant at the .05 level. ***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
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        PATENT Dependent Variable    FOLLPROD      QUALPROD     FUNCPROD         NEWPROD 
Explanatory |t| ˆ | | ˆ |t  |t| Variable βˆ  β  t β  | βˆ  βˆ  |t| 
.2 0 (1.88)* (0.76) .2669 .78)* -.0883 (0.62) -.0638 (0.29) RIVALIDEA 34 .1013 (1
RESEARCHCOOP * * * ** 
** 
RESEARCHCOOP * 
* 
  
4
 .5402 (3.21)** .3549 (2.15)* .5129 (2.82)** .0645 (0.36) .6868 (3.13)*
RESEARCHSTAFF 2.906 (1.49) 4.465 (2.23)** 6.625 (3.15)*** 9.137 (4.06)* 2.584 (1.17) 
RESEARCHSTAFF* -4.322 (1.98)* -4.459 (2.08)** -4.887 (2.12)** -3.486 (1.43) -.3743 (0.15) 
RESEARCHCOOP*RIVALIDEA -.0409 (0.20) .4068 (1.99)** -.0459 (0.21) .5118 (2.32)* .1282 (0.46) 
RESEARCHSTAFF*RIVALIDEA -.3311 (0.17) -2.373 (1.29) -3.771 (1.84)* -5.892 (2.90)*** -2.514 (1.22) 
LogL -2203.4  
Correlation of Error Terms 5992 (14.30)***, Rho31 = .4015 (7.50)***, Rho41 = .2125 (3.73)***, Rho51 = .1107 (1.55), Rho32 = .4759 (9.67)***,  
Observations 
Rho21 = .
Rho42 = .1797 (3.19)***, Rho52 = -.0257 (0.39), Rho43 = .2224 (3.89)***, Rho53 = .1329 (1.90)*, Rho54 = .1229 (1.67)*  
1022 
Note that all of the other control var isted in Table 2 are included but are suppressed to save space. Robust T-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level. 
able 5b: Regression Results with Control Variables for Research Cooperations, R&D Intensity and Interaction Effects; Method: Multivariate Probit 
        PATENT 
iables l
**Statistically significant at the .05 level. ***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
 
 
T
Dependent Variable    FOLLPROD      QUALPROD     FUNCPROD         NEWPROD 
Explanatory |t| ˆ | | ˆ |t  |t| Variable βˆ  β  t β  | βˆ  βˆ  |t| 
.2 3 9)** 70) .2448 06)** -.0 28 66) -.0670 1) RIVALIDEA 08 (2.2 .0881 (0. (2. 9 (0. (0.3
RESEARCHCOOP  *  ** 
** 
RESEARCHCOOP * 
* 8 0) 
57 1)**  
03.53
 .5215 (4.13)*** .3454 (2.20)* .4889 (3.54)*** .0601 (0.34) .6416 (3.33)*
RESEARCHSTAFF 2.804 (1.49) 4.441 (2.21)** 6.632 (3.13)*** 9.121 (4.10)* 2.315 (1.65)* 
RESEARCHSTAFF* -4.364 (2.07)* -4.473 (2.10)** -4.830 (2.12)** -3.470 (1.44) --- --- 
RESEARCHCOOP*RIVALIDEA --- --- .4281 (2.43)** --- --- .5203 (2.38)* .138 (0.5
RESEARCHSTAFF*RIVALIDEA --- --- -2.286 (1.36) -3.8 (2.2 -5.876 (2.91)*** -2.586 (1.30) 
LogL -22  
Correlation of Error Terms 5989 (14.28)***, Rho31 = .4017 (7.50)***, Rho41 = .2123 (3.73)***, Rho51 = .1111 (1.56), Rho32 = .4759 (9.68)***,  
Observations 
Rho21 = .
Rho42 = .1796 (3.19)***, Rho52 = -.0256 (0.39), Rho43 = .2226 (3.90)***, Rho53 = .1328 (1.89)*, Rho54 = .1235 (1.67)*  
1022 
Note that all of the other control var isted in Table 2 are included but are suppressed to save space. Robust T-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level. iables l
**Statistically significant at the .05 level. ***Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
 
 Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Zwick (2002) provides empirical evidence for employee resistance against innovations. 
2 See Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (2000) for a theoretical principal-agent analysis of the coherence 
of activities. 
3 See Röller and Sinclair-Desgagnè (1996) for a theoretical analysis of heterogenous firms. Empirical 
evidence on the heterogeneity of firms is provided by Oulton (1998). 
4 Findings by Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) indicate that the continuous accumulation of resources and 
competencies play a more important role than the size of R&D expenditures in maintaining innovative 
activities. This may also apply to the use of knowledge spillovers. 
5 Such a specialization may also hold in an international context with respect to backward countries 
and advanced countries. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) argue that firms in relatively 
backward economies invest in adopting existing technologies from the world frontier. Firms in 
advanced economies, that are closer to the world-technology frontier, pursue a research-based strategy. 
6 Details of the data set and how it can be accessed by researchers are given in Gerlach, Hübler and 
Meyer (2003). A complete copy of the questionnaire is available in Brand et al. (1996). 
7 Since the survey is based on the voluntary participation of establishments, the decline in sample size 
is not unusual. For the establishments not participating in the subsequent waves one main reason was 
that time limitations hindered participation. 
8 The type of restrictions imposed by collective bargaining in Germany remains a matter of debate. 
Lindbeck and Snower (2001) speculate that centralized collective bargaining is unavoidably 
incompatible with a flexible assignment of tasks within establishments as it follows the rule “equal 
pay for equal work” involving a standardization of wages and jobs. However, German unions just may 
have embarked on a wrong strategy. In the eighties, they began to reduce standard weekly hours, 
resulting in restrictions on working time flexibility (Hunt, 1999). 
9 The estimates were performed in STATA 8.0 using a program written by Lorenzo Capellari and 
Stephen P. Jenkins. 
10 Note that we also experimented with an interaction of all three key variables, i.e. 
RESEARCHSTAFF*RIVALIDEA*RESEARCHCOOP. Yet, it did not emerge as a significant determinant. 
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11 E.g., let us consider the launch of products with additional functions, FOLLPROD. If an establishment 
has no R&D employees (RESEARCHSTAFF = 0), the influence of R&D cooperation (RESEARCHCOOP = 
1) on the underlying latent variable is equal to 0.489. Let us now consider a second establishment that 
has a share of R&D employees equal to the mean in our sample (RESEARCHSTAFF = 0.031). While the 
share of R&D employees has a direct positive influence (0.205 = 6.625*0.031), it also has an indirect 
negative effect (–0.151 = –4.887*0.031*1) by reducing the influence of R&D cooperations. Thus in 
the second establishment, the net effect of R&D cooperation is only equal to 0.489 – 0.151 or 0.338. 
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